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Sherman Act Applications to

Predation by Controlled Economy
Enterprises Marketing in the
United States: Departures from
Mechanical Formulae

DEBORAH M. LEVY

In a reproachful dissent in United States v. Columbia
Steel,1 the late Justice Douglas sought to remind his brethren what the antitrust laws of the United States are all about:
[All power tends to develop into a government in itself. Power that
controls the economy should be in the hands of elected representatives
of the people, not in the hands of an industrial oligarchy. Industrial
power should be decentralized .... That is the philosophy and the com-

mand of the Sherman Act.
It is no small irony that the same distrust of industrial concentration in
private hands that animates the Sherman ActO also underlies the organization
of the state-controlled economy. In the words of Justice Douglas, this distrust
amounts to "a theory of hostility to the concentration in private hands of
power so great that only a government of the people should have it."3 In the
United States, the Sherman Act and other antitrust laws resulted from this
distrust of industrial concentration. Other nations, fearing the excesses of
private power, have created state-controlled economies, making industry part
of government. As economic barriers between relatively free market economies and controlled economies fall, their component commercial and industrial enterprises face competitors who are as alien in their business practices
and economic origins as in their nationality.
The official foreign trade monopolies of a state-controlled economy must
conduct business within the constraints of a central economic, political, and
social plan. Trade with market economies is potentially disruptive, because
Western 4 pricing policies, delivery schedules, and financing arrangements
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may not dovetail with the internal goals of the planned economy. 5 These same
goals, and the centralization required to pursue them, can be equally unsettling to market economies and their unordered constellations of businesses. In
free market economies, controlled economy enterprises (CEEs) threaten to
upset uncontrolled markets that function on the premise that businesses operate for private profit. When goods from a planned economy are marketed in an
unplanned economy, there is a potential for intentional or unwitting disruption
of the market when foreign government planners change production priorities
or pricing policies. In the late 1950s, for example, Soviet planners decided to
dispose of surplus aluminum and tin. Using contracts with deescalation
clauses, the Soviets were able to undercut the international price whenever it
fell. In this manner, they disposed of their surplus, causing the world aluminum and tin prices to collapse. The difficulty of characterizing such behavior
was raised by a witness at a 1974 Senate hearing on East-West trade and the
antitrust laws: "Is it dumping? Is it competition? We are on a very fine line
here. If it's dumping it should be curbed. If it's competition, it should be

encouraged."6
Any such line drawn to mark out areas of behavior by CEEs should not
stop at the difference between "dumping" and "competition," for the absence
of a statutory dumping violation does not necessarily indicate competition.
Indeed, competition, a difficult enough standard to use in evaluating the
behavior of free market firms, is a concept encountering even greater difficulty in discussions and evaluations of behavior by firms from controlled
economies.
In a market economy, some goods may enjoy a "natural competitive
advantage" 7 stemming from lower costs of capital, labor, or materials, for
example, or from efficient business practices. Firms with such advantages
can undersell their competitors, if they choose, or make other business
decisions exploiting their competitive advantages and successes. The greatest "natural competitive advantage" enjoyed by a market firm, however,
does not release that firm from the exigency of showing a profit. By contrast, a CEE need not turn a profit to suivive. Any disparity between a low
price and the higher value of the resources that go into a particular good
produced or marketed by a CEE is compensated for by other components of
the state economic plan. To characterize this central allocation of resources
in the same manner as cheap labor or efficient private management seems
inappropriate. The market economy notion of a "natural competitive advantage" is not easily applied to goods from a planned economy, where government planners set a low price in accordance with national objectives. Firms
from planned economies, as instrumentalities of their governments, enjoy a
variety of other advantages vis-&-vis their free market counterparts. Governments may be willing, through state enterprises, to enter new product markets or geographic markets, when private companies would be deterred by
the lack of private returns. Governments and their enterprises, seeking social returns and buttressed by other sectors of the economy, may forge
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ahead despite the absence of profits. State enterprises may establish coordinated marketing for exports and may take advantage of territorial monopolies of materials-in
both instances bringing substantial power to the mar8
kets they enter.
In short, "free marketers" in the United States face a competitor unrestrained by the unruly "rules" of competition. Traditionally, the disruption
wrought by CEEs has been addressed in the United States as a problem of
international trade regulation. 9 But the threat to competition posed by the
trading activities of state monopolies in United States markets makes a
Sherman Act response one that ought to be explored' 0 The first reason for
such a response has already been suggested: the absence of a dumping or
other statutory international trade regulation offense does not necessarily
indicate that all is well in the market. Controlled economy enterprises, as
government-supported monopolies, bring concentrated power to bear in
United States markets, and engage in trading practices susceptible of
predatory manipulation. Such power is of a dimension that the Sherman
Act (the Act) was meant to control; such practices, used to capture markets, are the sort the Act condemns. A state trader can use its monopoly
position at home to gain monopoly power in other markets, without violating the letter of the international trade regulation statutes. If, however, the
Sherman Act is meant to protect U.S. markets from the evils of monopolies,
and if monopoly is what a state trader is all about, a trade regulation response might miss the point. Moreover, statutory international trade regulation remedies by nature emphasize governmental or international trade interests, rather than the interests and complaints of the individual domestic
businesses affected by state monopoly power. While courts like to remind
litigants that the antitrust laws protect competition rather than competitors,"
antitrust laws do in fact protect individual firms, affording relief in the form
of treble damages to harmed "competitors." Relief of that sort is not generally
available through the trade regulation statutes. A treble damage private action for dumping is authorized by § 801 of the Revenue Act of 1916, but the
action does not encompass cases where there is no home market and no
other countries to which the product in question is exported from which to
calculate a price floor for the purpose of identifying dumping. A § 801 violation is predicated on imports priced below prices "in the principal markets of
the country of their production, or other foreign countries to which they are
commonly exported." But a dumping case against a CEE is likely to require
constructed or substituted price or value to establish dumping, given the
absence of sales (and thus comparable prices) of the product in the home
country, or the artificiality of those prices that are established, or the lack of
other countries of export. Such a cause of action against single-market export
activity, with the price of the allegedly dumped goods measured against a
constructed or substituted value, was cognizable under the Antidumping Act
of 1921 and remains so under the Tariff Act of 1930, § 773(c) (as amended
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by the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, § 101), but neither statute authorizes
a private suit.12
Quite apart from the private remedy gap in existing international trade
law is a more fundamental problem. There is a reluctance to characterize
marketing techniques of foreign government exporters as trade regulation
offenses. It has been argued by two Department of Justice officials that the3
antitrust laws "provide adequate remedies if true predation can be proved.'
Yet the Department of Justice has indicated in its Guide for International
Operations that predatory or unfair marketing by CEEs is within the province of the international trade laws.' 4 While it would be premature to conclude that predatory practices by CEEs marketing in the United States will
slip unnoticed or unabated through the cracks between U.S. antitrust and
international trade laws, and that the power of CEEs in U.S. markets will
grow to alarming magnitudes, it is not too early to examine the relevance and
possible application of the Sherman Act to the power and practices of CEEs.
In the first case to present these issues, Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 5
the court did not face up to the challenges posed to the free market by CEEs,
denying that the Sherman Act could be used to meet those challenges. But
although Sherman Act analysis must take account of the special problems
posed by the CEEs, the policies underlying the Act are indeed relevant to the
practices and power, including the potential power, of these firms.

THE CASE OF THE POLISH GOLF CARTS: ONE COURT'S RESPONSE TO
THE CONTROLLED ECONOMY ENTERPRISE

Pezetel Foreign Trade Enterprise of the Aviation Industry, an agency of the
People's Republic of Poland, began in 1970 to manufacture "Melex" (named
for Mielec, Poland, site of Pezetel's factory) electric golf carts solely for
export to the United States, under an agreement with a U.S. company
providing the specifications for the carts. 16 From eight carts in that year, the
imports burgeoned to 8,040 by 1974, amounting to 19 percent of the U.S.
electric golf cart market. Figures for the first few months of 1975 indicated
a 35 percent market share. As the market share of Melex carts increased,
sales of Cushman golf carts, manufactured by Outboard Marine Corporation
(OMC), dwindled. OMC could not meet Pezetel's low price. Together with
other U.S. manufacturers, OMC brought charges against Pezetel under the
Antidumping Act of 1921,'17 but by the end of 1975 it was forced to cease
production of its Cushman line. In 1977, OMC filed suit in federal district
court in Delaware, where Pezetel had incorporated a subsidiary, also known
as Melex, advancing, inter alia, several Sherman Act claims, supported in
part by theories of liability based on practices and advantages of Pezetel
inherent in its organization as a Communist state monopoly.
Count 1 of the complaint alleged that Pezetel, Melex, and the defendant
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distributors of Melex carts violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act by conspiring to restrain interstate and foreign trade; Count 2 alleged a Section 2
violation consisting of monopolization or attempted monopolization of the
manufacture, sale, and distribution of carts. Counts 3 and 4 were
Wilson
20
18
Tariff Act and Antidumping Act of 19169 claims, respectively.
OMC claimed that Pezetel's pricing practices were predatory and, as
such, actionable under Section 1 as elements of a plan to restrain trade, and
under Section 2 as culpable behavior leading to attempted or actual monopolization. The plaintiff did not allege below-cost pricing, arguing that this
standard had no meaning in a suit against an enterprise from a statecontrolled economy, where "the costs of materials, labor and capital even if
shown in books and records, reflect the value judgments not of the marketplace, but of central government planners."'" Predatory pricing was demonstrated, according to OMC, by Pezetel's practice of setting the price of
Melex golf carts "far below
the floor of the marketplace" in an exercise of
"raw economic power." 22
OMC also urged the court, for purposes of the monopolization charge, to
look beyond a mathematical calculation of market share in determining
whether Pezetel had achieved monopoly power. In calculating monopoly
power, OMC argued, the court should take into account the support afforded
Pezetel by the Polish government. The state monopoly could maintain its
prices because it was backed by vast-nationally-scaled-financial resources
far greater than those available to free market competitors. Unconstrained by
the need to show a profit, Pezetel was said to enjoy market power not measurable by a concentration ratio. Finally, OMC argued that Pezetel had forced
the five largest firms in the industry into a loss position, thereby demonstrating its monopoly position in the U.S. market.23
Ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, Judge
Schwartz was sensitive to OMC's quandary. He noted that its grave injury
was undisputed, but questioned whether the loss was cognizable under the
Sherman Act.24 His answer, in large part, was negative. All that survived of
the Sherman Act claims was a count of attempted monopolization predicated
on Pezetel's alleged 35 percent market share and the alleged use of territorial
restraints among its distributors to perpetuate that share 25-a claim that did
not rest on Pezetel's state-controlled characteristics,
but that could have
26
arisen against any species of business enterprise.

THE SECTION 1 COMPLAINT: PREDATION IN RESTRAINT OF
TRADE AND THE BELOW-COST PRICE TEST

Although the court found the concerted action element of Section 1 of the
Sherman Act satisfied by OMC's allegations regarding agreements between
Pezetel and Melex distributors, it rejected the allegation that the Melex pricing strategy was predatory and thus an unlawful restraint of trade. Predatory
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pricing, the court said, is an offense "generally manifested by selling below
one's own cost for the purpose of effectuating long term domination of the
market. ,2 7 By this standard, OMC's allegations of "predatory and unfair"
prices were deficient: "Notably absent are allegations that the prices are
below cost or that any of the defendants are foregoing a profit."28 The court
held that the below-cost predatory pricing standard was not subject to variations; to devise a new test or to allow OMC to prove the predatoriness of
Pezetel's pricing by evidence other than that bearing on costs and profits of
the defendant would "usurp Congress" and amount to nothing less than "a
perversion of both the judicial function and the antitrust laws." 29 In Judge
Schwartz's view, OMC was attempting to set up the antitrust laws as a
"sanctuary for those who cannot compete against lower prices be they the
result of simple efficiency, economies of scale, cheap labor, technological
expertise or anything other than commercially mischievous conduct."3 With
respect to pricing policies, commercially mischievous conduct can apparently
take just one form: namely, setting prices below costs.

THE SECTION 2 COMPLAINT

Judge Schwartz swiftly disposed of the allegation of monopolization, in a
sentence and a footnote. Relying solely on market concentration to the exclusion of all other indicators of monopoly power, he determined that under
United States v. Aluminum Company of America,31 Pezetel's 35 percent market share failed, as a matter of law, to establish monopolization. Acknowledging that the ability to control prices in the market was another usual test of
monopoly power, the court nonetheless held that market share alone was the
proper test for gauging the power of a CEE in a U.S. market.
In measuring the market power of a more conventional competitorone not benefited by a government subsidy-ability to control price
would be the focal point of the analysis ....
Here, the presence of a
controlled economy conferred upon the defendants power over price
that another competitor might
have achieved only through unlawful
32
anticompetitive conduct.
The court accepted the allegation that Pezetel's 35 percent market share
constituted a "reasonable probability of success" of monopolization sufficient
to show an attempt to monopolize if the "critical element" of specific intent
were shown. 33 But in another narrow interpretation, Judge Schwartz held
that he could not infer the requisite specific intent from Pezetel's pricing
practices. The plaintiff, Judge Schwartz stated, must allege conduct that is
not a "normal, industrial response to market opportunities," but rather that is
intended to limit the opportunities of competitors to drive them out of the
market.34 OMC's complaint regarding the low prices offered by Pezetel to
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Melex dealers did not meet this test, according to Judge Schwartz: "As earlier emphasized, the low prices offered to Melex dealers by defendant manufacturer or defendant importer are not alleged to be below Pezetel's costs or
otherwise predatory." 35 Of course, OMC did allege that the prices were
predatory, and earlier in the opinion Judge Schwartz noted that they were
described by the plaintiff as "predatory and unfair."36 The point was not that
OMC failed to allege either below-cost pricing or pricing practices that were
"otherwise predatory," but that the court failed to accept a theory of predatory
pricing that departed from the "below-cost" test.
37
Judge Schwartz based his rejection on United States v. Grinnell Corp.,
where the Supreme Court had identified the hallmark of monopolization as
"the willful acquisition or maintenance" of monopoly power in contradistinction to growth or development resulting from a superior product, business
acumen, or historic accident. Grinnell was not an attempted monopolization
case, but rather a case of monopolization. To find it controlling of the case
before him, Judge Schwartz must have assumed that the distinction between
willfulness of acquisition and innocent acquisition of power was instructive
of the distinction between behavior from which one could infer an intent to
acquire monopoly power, and behavior implying only innocent motives. Defendants in Grinnell, with 87 percent of the accredited central station service
business (involving the sales of burglar alarms, fire alarms, and sprinkler
systems) were deemed to hold monopoly power. "Willful acquisition" was
hardly in question, given the defendants' participation in restrictive agreements, pricing practices, and takeovers. The question before the Supreme
Court was one of the relevant market for the purpose of the antitrust offense.
Nevertheless, Judge Schwartz adopted "the language of Grinnell" as his
own:
That Pezetel's competitive advantage results from a government subsidy by a controlled economy that permits defendant to offer virtually
identical products at a cheaper price is not actionable under Sherman
Act § 2. Employing the language of Grinnell, such a product may be
considered superior to another comparable product available only at a
higher price. Certainly a firm that exploits the opportunity through
technology, cheap labor or a government subsidy to offer the same
product at a reduced price can be said to be responding normally to
market opportunities. As such, defendants [sic] use of low prices appears to fall with the Grinnell exception and therefore is not considered
38
mischievous conduct from which § 2 intent can be inferred.
In effect, the court fused a cost-based predatory pricing standard with the
Grinnell statement to conclude that a CEE which exploited its government
subsidy and management to offer the same product as its free market enterprise counterparts at a reduced price was no different from any competitor
exploiting the advantages with which it was blessed.
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PREDATION AND POWER: SHERMAN ACT APPLICATIONS TO THE
CONTROLLED ECONOMY ENTERPRISE

The Sherman Act is flexible enough to take notice of the special problems
posed to U.S. markets by East-West trade. Judge Schwartz's narrow reading
of the Sherman Act in this context may have resulted from a concern that
the plaintiff was seeking to convert the antitrust laws into a powerful instrument of protectionism. Such protectionism, which would afford particularized benefits in the form of treble damages to complaining U.S. firms,
would plainly be offensive to a system of international trade in a way that
the usual international trade regulation remedies are not. The latter, after
all, are admittedly protective of U.S. industry. Their use against practices
deemed unfair engenders none of the apparent hypocrisy that would attach
to similar use of the Sherman Act, with its philosophy of invigorating competition and safeguarding for consumers a diverse market. Moreover, international trade regulations, insofar as they are premised on price adjustments through tariff levies, reflect a willingness to accommodate the
disparate national economic values of both the importing and exporting
governments. This method of economic regulation appears more palatable
to foreign sovereigns than does antitrust regulation that, through its treble
damage provision, necessarily conveys a punitive message as well as an
indictment of foreign national economic views. Conceding the risk that the
Sherman Act might serve as a disguised form of protectionism, the fact
remains that the policies underlying the Act are decidedly relevant to the
challenges CEEs may present in the U.S. market. More importantly, these
policies, if thoughtfully wielded, are susceptible of fair and nonprotectionist
applications to state-controlled firms.

PREDATION: ASSIMILATING INTERNATIONAL RULES IN A SHERMAN
ACT ANALYSIS

Under Section 1, predatory pricing is a substantive offense, complete in itself
if joined by the required complicity, rather than, as in Section 2, conduct
from which inferences may be drawn about an intent to monopolize. If the
offense were defined exclusively in terms of below-cost pricing, judicial refinements might indeed pervert the statute. But the statute's concern is not,
in fact, so narrow. In analyzing a challenged pricing policy,
It is... important to determine whether the price-cutter possesses an
adventitious or meretricious advantage, unrelated to competitive merits,
either by reason of doing business in a multiterritorial market, where
the local price-cutting can be recouped by monopolistic profits elsewhere, or by reason of being able to subsidize a losing operation by the
profits from a different line of business .... 39
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This unrestrictive characterization of predatory pricing in restraint of
trade avoids stressing the exact mechanism and mathematics behind pricecutting. Even the Pezetel court used a subjective concept, "commercially
mischievous conduct," to describe the Section 1 evil. But the court simply
refused to find mischief in any pricing policy other than one involving the
setting of prices below marginal costs. Given the advantages it enjoys, a CEE
may well be able to set prices that are predatory in a meaningful sense, and
in restraint of trade, even if the prices are not measurably below costs. By
insisting on an allegation of below-cost pricing-an allegation that OMC was
evidently unable to make against a CEE, whose costs of production are
arguably as artificial as its product prices-the court cut off the inquiry
without giving the plaintiff an opportunity to prove that Pezetel's pricing
policies involved the very sort of mischief at which Section 1 is directed.
In like fashion the court's refusal to entertain OMC's argument that
Pezetel's intent to monopolize could be inferred from the defendant's prices
circumvented a thorough examination of the nature and purpose of the
pricing policies, giving short shrift the underlying principle of Swift & Co.
v. United States,4 ° that the character of actions and plans are crucial in
Sherman Act analysis. Specifically, by shrinking from the task of assaying
Pezetel's admixture of business and government, the court gave voice to a
contradictory judgment: that a CEE can be said to respond normally to the
"market" opportunity of its government-planned and government-proffered
subsidy monopoly.
41
The formula of normal behavior originated in the Standard Oil case,
where Justice White contrasted legitimate market ascendancy by "normal
methods of industrial development" with unlawful "new means of combination which were resorted to in order that greater power might be added than
would otherwise have arisen had normal methods been followed." 42 The usefulness and meaning of this distinction diminish when transposed into a case
involving a CEE. Even its reformulation in Grinnell, where "historic accident" had a place among the nonactionable sources of monopoly power, is of
limited relevance to a CEE case. Surely the Court was not there delivering an
opinion on the "historic accident" of centrally run economies. The Sherman
Act accountabilities of enterprises that benefit from the economic organization of their home states were not before the Court, not even by analogy.
Despite the inappositeness of the "below-cost" and "market opportunity"
tests, Section 2 case law provides some insight into the problem of reconciling antimonopolization policy with CEE practices. Monopolization is an offense involving the possession of monopoly power acquired by unlawful conduct. The conduct is either evaluated independently, against some standard
of unlawful activity, or examined as the basis from which an unlawful monopolistic intent can be inferred. If a firm does not achieve monopoly power,
it may nonetheless be guilty of an attempt to monopolize, if it acts with the
intent to garner that power and comes within a "dangerous probability" of
success.4 3 A firm may unlawfully exploit otherwise lawful advantages under
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Section 2: intent, modes
of operation, and market preeminence may combine
44
to create culpability.
In Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States45 the Supreme Court
elaborated on the type of proof required in an attempt case. While subjective
intent to injure competition is required, evidence about the defendant's state
of mind is not. The unlawful intent can be inferred from various evidentiary
sources-most importantly, from conduct.46 Whatever the difficulties of formulating definitions of monopolistic conduct or intent, the fact that such
conduct and intent are the focal points of a Section 2 inquiry is crucial to the
problem of how the pricing practices of CEEs might fit into the framework of
law.
These focal points should not be obfuscated by tests and formulae that
may not reveal anything about monopolization or attempted monopolization.
The purpose of identifying predatory practices and setting them up as tools of
analysis is to identify a broader offense-the intentional and unreasonable
control of competition. Unbending adherence to inflexible tests such as a
"cost-based predatory pricing analysis" may arrest the judicial function in
Section 2 of discerning unlawful conduct and intent. As Professor Lawrence
Sullivan has insisted in response to a sophisticated economic analysis identifying instances of predatory pricing,47 functional and objective
standards are
48
useful, but are not "the way... to get at predatoriness.,
Flexibility in ferreting out predation by state traders carries costs and
risks. If U.S. courts were to develop standards of predation that would transform the Sherman Act into an amorphous international "fair trade" regime
activated at the suggestion of market predominance by a state trader and
aimed directly at practices likely to be commonplace to CEEs, international
trading relations, as well as general U.S. foreign relations, would be imperfled. Other "flexible" remedies that might be achieved through modifications
to existing import regulations would run the same risks. It might be possible
to expand the 1916 Antidumping Act 49 to allow treble damage actions against
the type of single market export activity at issue in Pezetel, where there is
neither a home market, nor any other export market from which to calculate
a price floor for the purpose of identifying dumping. Alternatively, a private
antidumping remedy might be added to the Tariff Act of 1930,50 which authorizes only government action against single-market trading situations,
with the prices of the allegedly dumped goods measured against a constructed or substituted value. A private recovery remedy could be built into
the market disruption provisions of the Trade Act of 1974,51 or selected international trade regulation laws could be incorporated ito the "antitrust laws"
covered by the private action provision of the Clayton Act. 2
Such revisions would certainly cheapen the antitrust laws and contribute nothing substantial to the meaning of predation or monopoly power. If
tacked onto the body of traditional antitrust law, these amendments would
graft a policy having little to do with monopoly onto statutes having everything to do with monopoly. The resultant legal structure of "antitrust" law

78 • United States Perspectives
would be hobbled by an anomalous appendage that could strike against foreign marketers who have nowhere near a monopoly position, although they
may indeed have violated rules of fair trade. If patterned after antitrust laws,
but kept statutorily separate from them, these modifications of international
trade regulation laws would mark significant departures from the tendency to
treat international trade regulation at the governmental level, departures that
would transform protectionist laws into offensive weapons in the hand of
private U.S. firms.
The more realistic and difficult task is to adhere to standards of predation that will preserve the economic environment mandated by the Sherman
Act without interfering with international trade or political relations. To be
avoided are condemnations of a CEE's home organization, which could stir
up international animosities; unfair presumptive tests applied exclusively to
CEEs; and impossible requirements demanded of controlled economies regarding the way they conduct their foreign trade. To devise standards in
keeping with considerations of international relations, judges should turn to
international referents. They must identify conduct that is internationally
recognized as predatory and that is also of the same quality or that effects the
same evils as traditional Sherman Act predatory practices.
The General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs,' 3 for example, grapples
with state trading in a general manner, with respect to all the state parties,
and in a specific way, with provisions formulated for centrally planned states.
The antisubsidies provisions address a variant of the price advantage issue
seen in Pezetel, Article XVI prohibiting government subsidies that produce
lower export than domestic prices of goods, and Article VI allowing the importing state to assess a countervailing duty if injury to a potential or established industry is threatened or caused. Article XVII treats state trading specifically, admonishing state enterprises to make purchases and sales
... solely in accordance with commercial considerations, including
price, quality, availability, marketability, transportation and other conditions of purchases or sales, and... [to] afford the enterprises of the
other contracting parties adequate opportunities, in accordance with
customary business
practice, to compete for participation in such pur54
chases or sales.

The accession agreements of Poland, Romania, and Hungary, in acknowledgment of the special problems posed regarding freer international
trade by planned economies, commit those states to affirmative action to
increase imports, provide for special valuation treatment of their exports, and
devise safeguards for importing states against the three countries' export
prices. 5 While all these directives and declarations are subject to varied
interpretations, and while they have not bound the acceding states to a
regime of completely fair, free, and competitive international trade, they do
indicate common, if somewhat fuzzy, agreement about proper trade behavior.
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Norms of conduct have been established; material deviations are unfair and
predatory.
The Treaty of Rome56 also deals with state enterprises established by the
contracting parties, recognizing, like GATT, their obstructionist potential.
Unlike GATT's Article XVII rule of conduct, the Treaty of Rome's Article 37
required an adjustment of state trading monopolies "so as to ensure that,
when the transitional period expires, no discrimination exists between the
57
nationals of Member States as regards the supply or marketing of goods."
This adjustment was part of the more fundamental task of the EEC, that of
establishing a unified system of undistorted competition for public and private enterprises, with both types of enterprise subject to the rules of
competition. 58 Again, a standard of commercial conduct has been established
among nations. Agreement can also be reached bilaterally: when the United
States extends nondiscriminatory tariff treatment to a Communist country, it
includes in the bilateral agreement "safeguard arrangements" providing for
consultation when prospective or actual imports threaten or produce market
disruption.5 9 The 1974 Trade Act also authorizes import restrictions to prevent such disruption. 60 Even if not indicating consensus on norms, the bilateral agreements indicate commitments to adhere to certain modes of behavior or to submit to remedial consequences.
Agreements to preserve competition in East-West or public-private trade
have been framed consonant with sovereign interests and national goals.
There has been no effort to write state trading out of existence; there have
been varied and experimental efforts aimed at integrating state trading into
the international system. Poland was not asked to rid herself of her trade
monopoly before joining GATT; similarly, the state enterprises of the EEC
countries, though "adjusted" for competition's sake, are accorded deference
for the sake of politics. Article 90 of the Treaty of Rome qualifies the general
rule that public enterprises are subject to antitrust, antidumping, and antisubsidies rules with the statement that public undertakings "entrusted with
the operation of services of general economic interest or having the character
of a revenue-producing monopoly" are subject to the trade rules only to the
extent the application does not interfere with their functions. 6 1 In sum, there
has evolved an amalgam of deference to the political impulses animating
state enterprises and submission by these enterprises to standards of fair
trade and competition.
Of course, rules or standards of international law are rarely universally
agreed upon. Further, rules or standards to which a state binds itself in a
multilateral agreement such as GATT, or in a bilateral agreement, such as
one entered into under the Trade Act of 1974 extending nondiscriminatory
tariff treatment to a state-controlled economy, are not necessarily transferable
to other legal contexts such as the Sherman Act. To make more difficult the
question for "international" standards applicable to the type of transaction at
issue in Pezetel, only six Communist or Socialist countries are members of
GATE and thus bound to its rules on export sales;62 moreover, U.S. bilateral
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treaties, with rules against predatory export practices, do not span the controlled economy globe. 63 Therefore, even if one agreed that the standards
regarding market disruption and unremunerative pricing expressed in these
international documents help identify predatory practices in the context of
the Sherman Act, a great many nations would remain uncovered by any such
standards. This limited coverage would be politically unpalatable, as nations
with which the United States has come to a trading modus vivendi through
negotiations and treaties would be at a comparative disadvantage to those
nations without this status and its attendant obligations.
The discrepancy could be avoided by applying the relevant standards
without discrimination. Such uniform application seems unobjectionable for
the same reasons that transferring international standards contained in conventions should not be seen as violating principles of treaty law and interpretation: the courts would not be spuriously creating or expanding international responsibilities or liabilities out of arbitrarily selected conventional
provisions. Their use of international behavioral criteria would in fact manifest a sensitivity to foreign interests, while at the same time this use would
serve legitimate domestic competition policy. Nothing in international law
constrains U.S. courts from finding predation and attaching liability under
domestic laws to any number of practices engaged in by foreign firms,
whether free market or state-controlled. What this flexible (and necessarily
imprecise) transfer of international standards would signify is the recognition that while state trading might present myriad instances of practices
that seem vaguely unfair, and fewer examples of practices that seem undesirable (and thus possibly actionable under the Sherman Act if present in
conjunction with other elements proscribed by the law), U.S. judges will
not depend on parochial notions of commercial mischief. Neither, however,
will they close their eyes to all predation that stems from state planning by
woodenly adhering to tests for predation that could never be applied to
CEEs. Such rigidity would ignore the possibilities of law and accommodation. As John Zysman mused, looking to the future,
These state traders confront the advanced capitalist countries with new
conditions of trade competition. The question is whether this layer of
trade surrounding the core of the principal OECD countries is cut off
from private trade, incorporated within present arrangements for con- 64
ducting private trade, or has altered the system of private trade itself.
The Sherman Act need not be irrelevant to the marketing practices in
this country of commercial enterprises from controlled economies, and international rules of trade, however imperfectly formulated and incompletely
adopted, need not be irrelevant to antitrust analysis. The former can find
useful and fair standards in the latter, and the latter can find expression and
advancement within a domestic legal framework constructed to keep intact 65
a
social and economic environment to which the United States is committed.
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ASSESSING THE MONOPOLY POWER OF CONTROLLED ECONOMY
ENTERPRISES

In ascertaining the power an enterprise holds in a market and in determining
whether that power amounts to monopoly power, courts would find little
guidance in rules and standards set out in international trade agreements.
Rules of conduct do not speak to de facto states of affairs, however carefully
the rules may be designed to promote or deter certain future balances and
distributions. Yet the characterization of market power is as much a part of
Section 2 of the Sherman Act analysis as the characterization of behavior,
and the state trader may bring to a free market very great power by virtue of
its government-sanctioned monopoly and national deep pocket.
The Alcoa 30-60-90 test is not the last word on monopoly power, and it
was probably not intended to be. Indeed, given the circumstances in which it
was formulated, the argument can be made that it is particularly inappropriate for generalized use. Judge Hand did not arrive at the ratios in a deductive
manner; rather, the fractions were presented to him as operative facts of the
case and he analyzed them in that context. To adopt these ratios-which, as
the difference between the lower court's and Judge Hand's calculations indicates, were highly susceptible to manipulation-as generally significant overlooks the historical setting and binds post-Alcoa cases to an amalgamation of
market statistics and corporate behavior that happened to emerge in that
case. Unquestioning adoption of the Alcoa test rests the determination of
monopoly power on market share analysis which fortuitously occupied Judge
Hand's opinion.
Closer scrutiny of Alcoa reveals that Judge Hand himself did not rely
solely on the concentration ratio in determining whether Alcoa held monopoly power. He emphasized that the reason Alcoa's proportion of the market
was significant was that it gave the company virtually complete control in the
market.66 While he acknowledged his focus on the concentration of producing power, he reiterated that a root evil was the "possession of unchallenged
economic power." If that power existed, it was "irrelevant" that the possessor
reaped only a fair profit.67
In United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.,68 Judge Wyzanski
brought to "exfoliation," as he later put it,69 the inherencies in the seeds of
Alcoa. These inherencies, according to Judge Wyzanski, who was Judge
Hand's law clerk when the latter handed down the Alcoa decision, amounted
to a market structure analysis for Section 2 monopolization. In estimating a
defendant's strength under such an analysis, Judge Wyzanski gave some
weight to its percentage of the market, but he also felt it proper to examine its
pricing policies, to compare the defendant and its competitors in terms of
financial resources, facilities, accumulated experience, and variety of products
offered, and to take note of the market barriers erected by the defendant.7'
The list of monopoly power indicia can be amended as new market
situations arise. If a firm acts as though it has preponderant market power, a
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tentative inference of monopoly power can be drawn. If a firm performs as if
it has dominant market power, a similar inference can be drawn. Although
one usually thinks of exorbitant profits as the main act of a monopolist
performance, the performance may entail whatever activities the monopolist
wishes to pursue and is able to pursue thanks to its release from the worries
of competition: maximization of sales volume, maximization of cash flow, or
even the achievement of a favorable image. 7' While not determinative, "size
is itself an earmark of monopoly power,"72 and cannot be ignored as a red flag
marking monopoly power. Where "market power" may appear absent by
market concentration standards, "monopoly power" may nonetheless exist in
terms of vast aggregations of wealth that can underwrite a ruthless ascent to
market predominance. One might test for this monopoly power
by surveying
73
the financial resources available to the firm under scrutiny.
Distinguishing the particularized finding in the Alcoa case from the
general theory underlying those finding leads one to a rather broad lesson
that has been largely ignored in Section 2 cases. Judge Hand recognized that
a finder of fact would come out differently in the case if he began with a
different opinion regarding what goods and productive capacity were competing in the market. The inquiry central to identifying monopoly power concerns what a firm brings to the market and whether what it brings can crush
its competitors. The power that a CEE brings to the market in questionassets, state management, longevity while maintaining unremunerative
prices-is not reflected in a concentration ratio. It should, however, factor
heavily in a realistic evaluation of its power in the market.
In this area, as in that of predatory practices, judges may subject the
Sherman Act to hostile criticism by applying novel tests to CEEs when commonplace standards yield no useful information. Here again, however, as in
the predation field, the inquiry suggested is consistent with (and in fact no
departure from) that which is normally undertaken in Section 2 analysis.
Courts generally determine the existence of monopoly power by employing a
flexible calculus embodying a wide spectrum of indicia. It happens that
when judges deal (as they always have) with free market firms, a large
percentage of sales that a firm is able to capture in the market is particularly
persuasive evidence of monopoly power. When dealing with CEEs, the other
indicia should gain in significance. A court has a duty under the Sherman
Act to discern monopoly power. It can do little with tests that measure the
concern of the statute incompletely, if not misleadingly.
However consistent with Sherman Act policy (and even necessary for
Sherman Act enforcement) one considers this means of discerning monopoly
power, the problems attendant to its actual application cannot be wished
away or muffled by good intentions. Courts may come dangerously close to
banning CEEs from the U.S. market for the concomitants of their very nature: size and freedom of action in formulating market strategies. The suggestion has been made that smallness is a virtue in industrial organization,
and that the antitrust laws exist in part as tools to prevent the absolute size of
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a firm from reaching gargantuan proportions. 7 1 Whether this belief or commitment is truly part of Sherman Act policy, it should have no voice in
proceedings against CEEs. These enterprises embody the economic and social policy of another sovereign, and the requirement to comply with U.S. law
should not grow into an insistence, that the foreign sovereign revamp its
internal organization. The doctrine of comity cautions against judicial zealousness when a controversy reaches deeply into the interests of a foreign
sovereign. There are also political limits to what the adversary process can
accomplish with respect to monopoly power, domestic or foreign, and the
evils it wreaks on consumers and on social and economic structures.

CONCLUSION

One should recall the irony presented at the beginning of this article, that
U.S. antitrust laws and centrally planned economies have addressed the
same problem and come up with widely differing solutions: a system of
maximum competition among private actors and a regime of public monopolies. If the issue of monopoly power were merely one of economic power, a
CEE would have no unique cause for complaint upon being told by a U.S.
court that its power in a U.S. market was at an unacceptable level. But the
issue is more fundamental, reaching into general questions of power; a centrally planned government might perceive any U.S. court judgment against
the strength of its foreign trade organizations as an attack upon its vital
economic and political interests. Power is quintessentially politics. The
danger faced by courts in considering allegations of predatory practices by
CEEs is one of purposefully or inadvertently honoring protectionist protestations having nothing to do with Sherman Act policy. The danger posed at this
juncture with respect to monopoly power is that judges will make determinations having too much to do with the essence of the Sherman Act-that is,
U.S. judges may intrude into the arena of core governmental concerns. The
judicial function in domestic antitrust cases naturally enough includes the
enforcement of antitrust claims against privately owned corporations. Inevitably, this involves an acceptable, albeit significant, judicial intrusion into the
behavior and structure of U.S. enterprises. The acceptability of this function
diminishes when judges assume a similar role in policing the activities and
structure of CEEs, necessarily implicating foreign sovereign interests and
decision making.
But the difficulties should not deter judges who are presented with
monopolization cases against CEEs from fulfilling the purposes of the Sherman Act by seeking out monopoly power, just as the fine line that separates
predation from competition in the range of CEE marketing practices should
not discourage judges from uncovering truly predatory activities in Section 1
and 2 cases. As the tests already outlined suggest, courts can apply the
Sherman Act with meaning to both the practices and power of CEEs, pro-
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vided they unchain themselves from formulae that are largely irrelevant to
CEEs. Courts can couple enforcement with fair-mindedness and tolerance of
international diversity if they tailor their new test of CEE predation to international standards and if they observe the political limits on the judicial
process in their evaluations of the power the state traders bring to U.S.
markets.
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